TACTICS SERIES: POST 5 | Adapting

Adapting

In any problem where an opposing force exists and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against environment.
B. H. Liddell Hart

The modern battlefield is characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and rapid change. Each situation is a unique combination of shifting factors that cannot be controlled with precision or certainty. This chapter discusses ways to adapt or modify our decisions in response to changed circumstances or sudden opportunities. An actively proficient leader must be able to adapt actions to each situation. 

The OODA loop discussed in chapter 4 essentially describes the process of adaptation—we observe the situation, orient to it, decide what to do, and act. The force that can consistently adapt more quickly to the situation will have a significant advantage. Adaptability is thus an important part of tactics. In essence, adaptability means shortening the time it takes to adjust to each new situation.

There are two basic ways to adapt. Sometimes we have enough situational awareness to understand a situation in advance and take preparatory action. This is anticipation. At other times we have to adapt to the situation on the spur of the moment without time for preparation. This is improvisation. To be fully adaptable, we must be able to do both.

Anticipation

The first basic way to adapt is to anticipate, which means introducing new methods, schemes, or techniques for future use. To anticipate, we must forecast future actions, at least to some extent. Our forecasts are usually based on past experiences. Often, a forecast involves considering what we learned through trial and error in training, exercises, or actual combat. An excellent example of anticipation is the Marine Corps' development of amphibious warfare techniques at Quantico during the 1920s and 1930s. These techniques proved essential to success in World War II, both in the Pacific and in Europe.

All planning at all echelons is a form of anticipatory adaptation—adapting our actions in advance. Another important tool for tactical adaptation is the use of immediate-action drills or standing operating procedures. These are practiced, predesigned, generic actions that cover common situations. Having a collection of these tools at our disposal allows us to react immediately in a coordinated way to a wide variety of tactical situations. Immediate-action drills do not replace the need for tactical judgment; they merely provide a way to seize initiative in the early stages of a developing situation until we can take more considered action. They provide the basis for adaptation.

Improvisation

The second basic way to adapt is to improvise, to adjust to a situation on the spur of the moment without any preparation. Like anticipation, improvisation is key to maneuver warfare. Improvisation requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders who have an intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not.

Improvisation is of critical importance to increasing speed. It requires commanders who have a strong situational awareness and a firm understanding of their senior commander's intent so that they can adjust their own actions in accordance with the higher commander's desires. Often, we find ourselves in a situation where our organic resources—weapons, vehicles, and so on—are not adequate to keep us moving quickly. In France in 1940, German General Heinz Guderian put some of his infantry in commandeered French buses. In Grenada, when Army Rangers needed vehicles, they took East German trucks belonging to the Grenadian army. Sound unorthodox? There is nothing "orthodox" about failure due to an inability to adapt.

Flexible Plans 

We have several techniques to help us develop adaptability. One of these is to make flexible plans. Flexible plans can enhance adaptability by establishing a course of action that provides for multiple options. For example, a blocking position that covers two avenues of approach from the same location, rather than only one, provides the flexibility to adapt to an enemy approaching through either avenue.

We can increase our flexibility by providing branches for current and future operations. Branches are options (e.g., changing dispositions, orientation, strength, or movement, or accepting or declining an engagement) for dealing with battlefield conditions that may affect the plan.

Flexibility can also be increased by providing sequels for current and future operations. Sequels are courses of action to follow probable battle or engagement outcomes: victory, defeat, or stalemate.

The value of branches and sequels is that they prepare us for several different actions. We should keep the number of branches and sequels relatively small. We should not try to develop so many branches and sequels that we cannot adequately plan, train, or prepare for any of them. The skillful,well-thought-out use of branches and sequels becomes an important means of anticipating future courses of action. This anticipation helps accelerate the decision cycle, thereby increasing tempo.

Flexible plans avoid unnecessary detail that not only consumes time during development but also tends to restrict subordinates' latitude. Instead, flexible plans outline what needs to be accomplished but leave the manner of accomplishing it to subordinates. This allows subordinates the flexibility to handle a broader range of circumstances.

Flexible plans are plans that can be easily changed. Plans that require coordination are said to be "coupled." If all the parts of a plan are too tightly coupled, the plan is harder to change because changing any one part requires changing all the others. Instead, we should try to develop modular, loosely coupled plans. Then if we change or modify any one part of the plan, it does not directly affect all the other parts.

Finally, flexible plans should be simple plans. Simple plans are easier to adapt to the rapidly changing, complex, and fluid situations that we experience in combat.

Decentralization

Another excellent way to improve adaptability is to decentralize decision-making authority as much as each situation allows. This means that commanders on the scene and closest to the events have the latitude to address the situation as required, on their own authority—but always in accordance with the higher commander's intent. This decentralization speeds up reaction time: we do not have to wait for information to flow up to a higher commander and orders to flow back down. It increases the organization's responsiveness, which in turn increases adaptability. Decentralizing control through mission orders is one of the tools we use to maximize our ability to adapt.

Confidence in subordinates' abilities plays an important role in decentralization. Leaders who have confidence in their subordinates and adapt their capabilities will feel more comfortable granting them greater latitude in accomplishing tasks. It fosters a climate in which leaders know their intent will be carried out.

Being able to have subordinates take initiative and complete the mission is a unique advantage of the West, something that the United States has mastered. “A Chinese military that fully embraces mission command would likely lead to improved operational performance, with quicker decision-making, better adaptability, and greater resilience in the face of degraded C4ISR,” according to a new report by the RAND Corporation, a think tank specializing in military matters. However, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army employs a strict, top-down structure that does not allow for interpretation, making it rigid and unable to properly adapt. 

Conclusion

Successful warfare is filled with examples of leaders adapting to changing situations. We must start learning how to adapt now during our training. Leaders should value and encourage innovative thinking. Moreover, they should expect creative thinking from their subordinates because it creates new opportunities.

We can train our subordinates by placing them in positions of influence, providing tactical decision games, letting them experiment, and most important of all, letting them fail. Through their failure, they will learn and get better.  

For adaptation to be effective, commanders must readily exploit the opportunities uncovered by subordinates. Commanders cannot remain tied to plans that blind them to fleeting opportunities. While making the best possible preparations, they must welcome and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities.