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<h2>The Combined Arms Dilemma</h2><p><em>&nbsp;There is still a tendency in each separate unit . . . to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire. . . . That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins.<br></em>General George S. Patton Jr.</p><p>King Philip IV of Macedonia professionalized, trained, and improved the Macedonian army. He equipped his phalanx with longer spears and trained his light troops alongside the hoplites and cavalry. He integrated the hoplites, skirmishers, and cavalry into a combined-arms force. This was a unique concept that revolutionized warfare, allowing his son, Alexander the Great, to become one of the most dominant generals ever.&nbsp;</p><p>The Romans would later institutionalize a modular, combined-arms approach and would create the greatest Empire that the world had ever seen.&nbsp;</p><h3>What is the Combined Arms Dilemma?</h3><p>The entire purpose of the combined arms dilemma is to present the enemy not just with a problem but with a dilemma (who would have thought?)-- a no-win situation. It uses all available means to present an unwinnable scenario for the enemy.&nbsp;</p><p>When in a fight, you do not just want to throw jabs, but you want to present the enemy with a suite of options for his demise. Trying to defend against jabs, hooks, cuts, teeps, roundhouse kicks, takedowns, and more creates problems and creates gaps. If you throw enough punches to the liver, he will lower his guard, allowing you to hit him in the face. If you hit his face enough, he will raise his guard, allowing you to hit him in the liver.&nbsp;</p><p>Similarly, in war, when facing an entrenched enemy, you assault with infantry. As the enemy reacts to the advancing infantry, they expose themselves to indirect fire and close air support, forcing them to take cover, allowing the infantry to advance. The enemy must react to either the infantry or the artillery, or they will be destroyed, but reacting to one exposes them to the other.&nbsp;</p><p>This is what the combined arms dilemma is. It presents the enemy with multiple threats and forces them into a dilemma: they must choose to focus on one threat while the other kills them. MDCP 1 defines the combined arms dilemma as "the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another."</p><p>Modern tactics are combined arms tactics. Combining the effects of infantry, armor, indirect fire, and aviation creates the greatest possible effect against the enemy. The strengths of the arms complement and reinforce each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are protected or offset by the capabilities of the other.&nbsp;</p><h3>Five Dimensional Combined Arms</h3><p>Combined arms across five dimensions means using all available means to confront the enemy with multifaceted, reinforcing, and rapidly shifting dilemmas at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to shatter his cohesion, corrupt his decision-making, and increase his friction.&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Multifaceted</strong></p><p>The classic example of combining direct and indirect kinetic lethal fires to present the enemy with a dilemma holds but is no longer sufficient. Most enemy forces will have multiple options, not just two. Multiple enemy courses of action must be confronted with multiple friendly capabilities so that his reaction, any reaction, will expose a critical vulnerability to a friendly capability.</p><p><strong>Reinforcing</strong></p><p>Combined-arms dilemmas must be developed in depth. Enemies can choose a course of action, come what may, and "push through" a dilemma presented by one of our arms. If this is the case, his reward must be another layer of dilemma presented by still another capability.&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Rapidly Shifting</strong></p><p>We cannot present a dilemma to an enemy and then wait to see the effect. We must be able to adroitly shift multiple dilemmas so that the enemy is confronted not just with a pattern of dilemmas but with a kaleidoscope thereof. By the time he has gained situation awareness, the situation has already changed. Rapidly shifting from maneuver to maneuver contributes to both combat power and combined arms dilemmas.</p><p>Multifaceted, reinforcing, and rapidly shifting combined-arms operations require the ability to fight and to generate intelligence to identify surfaces and gaps, while simultaneously protecting friendly surfaces and gaps, in order to drive maneuver. Moreover, five-dimensional combined arms must be performed simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This means that individual enemy units are vulnerable to multiple friendly capabilities, the enemy's campaign plan is in disarray or puts them at a disadvatnage, and the very act of confronting our forces threatens their ends.&nbsp;</p><p><strong>Implications</strong></p><p>The implications of the expanding character of combined arms are many, but none more important than the need to fuse more forms of combat arms support. The nature of combined arms has not changed; it remains about the mutual and reinforcing effects of numerous capabilities. Its character, though, is to employ all types of warfare, with new and innovative applications of artillery and aviation fires in support of maneuver. Fire support coordination at every level focuses on coordinating maneuver, artillery, and aviation, but must now include additional capabilities.&nbsp;</p>

The Combined Arms Dilemma

<h2>Cooperating</h2><p><em>An Army is a team. It lives, eats, sleeps, fights as a team.</em><br>General George S. Patton Jr.</p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">Everything we have to do in tactics — gaining an advantage and, above all, achieving a decisive result — requires a team effort. If efforts are not in harmony, results may be indecisive. For example, if the aviation combat element's actions are not harmonized with those of the ground combat element, they are unlikely ot have a decisive effect. If your fire support is not well coordinated with an infantry attack, combined arms synergy will not be achieved, and the attack may fail. However, achieving this team effort is easier said than done. It requires rapidly maneuvering forces, often widely dispersed, to work together under the most adverse conditions.</span></p><h3><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">Control in Combat</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Because war is characterized by chaos, uncertainty, and rapid change, control quickly breaks down. It is probably a mistake to speak of control in combat. According to MCDP 6, "given the nature of war, it is a delusion to think that we can be in control with any sort of certitude or precision." As anyone who has experienced combat will undoubtedly agree, it is impossible to control everything. Attempts to impose control also can easily undermine the initiative upon which tactics depend. Subordinates can become hesitant; they may feel they must wait for orders before acting. We are not likely to move faster or gain leverage over a competent opponent unless personnel at every level exercise initiative.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>The dilemma, then, is this: How do we achieve the goal of working together in harmony while exercising a more decentralized type of control?</span></p><h3><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">Cooperation</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">The beginning of the answer lies in cooperation. We define cooperation as the union of self-discipline and initiative in pursuit of a common goal. Cooperation can be viewed as a component of control.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Control can generally be divided into two types: centralized and decentralized. Centralized control tends to be one-way and works from the top down: someone at a higher level determines what subordinates will and will not do. Centralized control makes us conform to higher dictates because only one person does the thinking for the organization — the person in control.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>In contrast, decentralized control works from the bottom up. Command is the exercise of authority and guidance, and control is felt as feedback about the effects of the action taken because thinking is required at all levels. This feedback allows the commander to adapt to changing circumstances and to command subsequent action. Cooperation is required in decentralized control. Subordinates work together laterally and from the bottom up to accomplish tasks that fulfill the commander's intent. Cooperation means we take the initiative to help those around us accomplish our shared mission.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Cooperation is essential to tactics. The flight leader and wingman work based on cooperation. These pilots cooperate with the infantry they support. Two infantry units, fighting side by side, cooperate. We all work together far more effectively when we communicate laterally than when we communicate only through higher headquarters and respond only to centralized direction. As an ancillary benefit, we relieve our overloaded communications.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>The history of tactics is filled with examples where cooperation made the difference — and control could not. One example is when a Huey pilot spent ten hours guiding and designating targets to a flight of Cobras in Operation Desert Storm. The pilots worked together to destroy targets and accomplish the mission.</span></p><h3><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Discipline</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Cooperation can harmonize efforts and get everyone to work together without the centralized control that undermines initiative. However, it raises a more fundamental question: How do we prepare people to cooperate when rounds start flying?</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>The answer is discipline: There is only one kind of discipline--PERFECT DISCIPLINE. If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are potential murderers." In the face of adversity and difficulty, discipline enables individuals to pursue what is best for those around them and their unit. Individuals and units might have the desire, but without the discipline they will be unable to accomplish the most difficult tasks in combat--operating faster than the enemy, gaining advantage, generating decisive force, and achieving decisive results.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>In combat, instant obedience to orders is crucial. Orders may not be popular, but there comes a point where they must be carried out without question. Discipline is a result of training. In training for war, discipline should be firm, but fair. The United States Marine Corps is known as a highly disciplined fighting force. Discipline is one of the strengths that make Marines equally effective assaulting a beach, conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation, fighting a fire, or guarding embassies. Nonetheless, discipline is founded not only on obedience but also on a sense of duty.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>The discipline needed for cooperation comes from two sources: imposed discipline and self-discipline. The first source, imposed discipline, is more often associated with the term "military discipline. Imposed discipline, typified by the Prussian approach, is characterized by instant obedience to orders. External in nature, it ensures compliance with established procedures, rules, or guidance and direction from above. It is a means to achieve efficiency in the accomplishment of routine duties or drills. In its most extreme form, it can be rigid, paralyzing, and destructive of initiative. Imposed discipline also may make units vulnerable to the effects of chaos and uncertainty and unable to cooperate.</span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Self-discipline is an internal force that obligates us to do what is right. Athletes as well as warfighters can see this. Team players instinctively back up their teammates. In baseball, the outfielders cover each other on flyballs, the catcher backs up first base on a routine play, and the infield covers the pitcher on every hit. Members of squads and fire teams also work together as teams to accomplish tasks and take care of each other. A coach or leader cannot enforce this cooperation among teammates. It depends on the self-discipline of the individuals.</span></p><h3><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">Conclusion</span></h3><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;"><br>Modern tactics rely on cooperation. Cooperation, in turn, depends on discipline. Discipline consists of both imposed discipline and self-discipline. As leaders, we must create a climate in which self-discipline and a high level of initiative can flourish within the boundaries of military discipline. This climate depends on us. Words are easy, action is hard. &nbsp;We judge actions, not words, and respond positively to leadership by example. If an environment of discipline is expected and demonstrated, cooperation will follow.&nbsp;</span></p>

TACTICS SERIES: POST 6 | Cooperating

<h2>Adapting</h2><p><em>In any problem where an opposing force exists and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war as in life—war being but a concentrated form of the human struggle against environment.</em> <br>B. H. Liddell Hart</p><p>The modern battlefield is characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and rapid change. Each situation is a unique combination of shifting factors that cannot be controlled with precision or certainty. This chapter discusses ways to adapt or modify our decisions in response to changed circumstances or sudden opportunities. An actively proficient leader must be able to adapt actions to each situation.&nbsp;</p><p>The OODA loop discussed in chapter 4 essentially describes the process of adaptation—we observe the situation, orient to it, decide what to do, and act. The force that can consistently adapt more quickly to the situation will have a significant advantage. Adaptability is thus an important part of tactics. In essence, adaptability means shortening the time it takes to adjust to each new situation.</p><p>There are two basic ways to adapt. Sometimes we have enough situational awareness to understand a situation in advance and take preparatory action. This is anticipation. At other times we have to adapt to the situation on the spur of the moment without time for preparation. This is improvisation. To be fully adaptable, we must be able to do both.</p><h3>Anticipation</h3><p>The first basic way to adapt is to anticipate, which means introducing new methods, schemes, or techniques for future use. To anticipate, we must forecast future actions, at least to some extent. Our forecasts are usually based on past experiences. Often, a forecast involves considering what we learned through trial and error in training, exercises, or actual combat. An excellent example of anticipation is the Marine Corps' development of amphibious warfare techniques at Quantico during the 1920s and 1930s. These techniques proved essential to success in World War II, both in the Pacific and in Europe. </p><p>All planning at all echelons is a form of anticipatory adaptation—adapting our actions in advance. Another important tool for tactical adaptation is the use of immediate-action drills or standing operating procedures. These are practiced, predesigned, generic actions that cover common situations. Having a collection of these tools at our disposal allows us to react immediately in a coordinated way to a wide variety of tactical situations. Immediate-action drills do not replace the need for tactical judgment; they merely provide a way to seize initiative in the early stages of a developing situation until we can take more considered action. They provide the basis for adaptation.</p><h3>Improvisation</h3><p>The second basic way to adapt is to improvise, to adjust to a situation on the spur of the moment without any preparation. Like anticipation, improvisation is key to maneuver warfare. Improvisation requires creative, intelligent, and experienced leaders who have an intuitive appreciation for what will work and what will not. </p><p>Improvisation is of critical importance to increasing speed. It requires commanders who have a strong situational awareness and a firm understanding of their senior commander's intent so that they can adjust their own actions in accordance with the higher commander's desires. Often, we find ourselves in a situation where our organic resources—weapons, vehicles, and so on—are not adequate to keep us moving quickly. In France in 1940, German General Heinz Guderian put some of his infantry in commandeered French buses. In Grenada, when Army Rangers needed vehicles, they took East German trucks belonging to the Grenadian army. Sound unorthodox? There is nothing "orthodox" about failure due to an inability to adapt.</p><h3>Flexible Plans&nbsp;</h3><p>We have several techniques to help us develop adaptability. One of these is to make flexible plans. Flexible plans can enhance adaptability by establishing a course of action that provides for multiple options. For example, a blocking position that covers two avenues of approach from the same location, rather than only one, provides the flexibility to adapt to an enemy approaching through either avenue. </p><p>We can increase our flexibility by providing branches for current and future operations. Branches are options (e.g., changing dispositions, orientation, strength, or movement, or accepting or declining an engagement) for dealing with battlefield conditions that may affect the plan. </p><p>Flexibility can also be increased by providing sequels for current and future operations. Sequels are courses of action to follow probable battle or engagement outcomes: victory, defeat, or stalemate. </p><p>The value of branches and sequels is that they prepare us for several different actions. We should keep the number of branches and sequels relatively small. We should not try to develop so many branches and sequels that we cannot adequately plan, train, or prepare for any of them. The skillful,well-thought-out use of branches and sequels becomes an important means of anticipating future courses of action. This anticipation helps accelerate the decision cycle, thereby increasing tempo. </p><p>Flexible plans avoid unnecessary detail that not only consumes time during development but also tends to restrict subordinates' latitude. Instead, flexible plans outline what needs to be accomplished but leave the manner of accomplishing it to subordinates. This allows subordinates the flexibility to handle a broader range of circumstances. </p><p>Flexible plans are plans that can be easily changed. Plans that require coordination are said to be "coupled." If all the parts of a plan are too tightly coupled, the plan is harder to change because changing any one part requires changing all the others. Instead, we should try to develop modular, loosely coupled plans. Then if we change or modify any one part of the plan, it does not directly affect all the other parts. </p><p>Finally, flexible plans should be simple plans. Simple plans are easier to adapt to the rapidly changing, complex, and fluid situations that we experience in combat.</p><h3>Decentralization</h3><p>Another excellent way to improve adaptability is to decentralize decision-making authority as much as each situation allows. This means that commanders on the scene and closest to the events have the latitude to address the situation as required, on their own authority—but always in accordance with the higher commander's intent. This decentralization speeds up reaction time: we do not have to wait for information to flow up to a higher commander and orders to flow back down. It increases the organization's responsiveness, which in turn increases adaptability. Decentralizing control through mission orders is one of the tools we use to maximize our ability to adapt. </p><p>Confidence in subordinates' abilities plays an important role in decentralization. Leaders who have confidence in their subordinates and adapt their capabilities will feel more comfortable granting them greater latitude in accomplishing tasks. It fosters a climate in which leaders know their intent will be carried out. </p><p>Being able to have subordinates take initiative and complete the mission is a unique advantage of the West, something that the United States has mastered. “A Chinese military that fully embraces mission command would likely lead to improved operational performance, with quicker decision-making, better adaptability, and greater resilience in the face of degraded C4ISR,” according to a new report by the RAND Corporation, a think tank specializing in military matters. However, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army employs a strict, top-down structure that does not allow for interpretation, making it rigid and unable to properly adapt.&nbsp;</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Successful warfare is filled with examples of leaders adapting to changing situations. We must start learning how to adapt now during our training. Leaders should value and encourage innovative thinking. Moreover, they should expect creative thinking from their subordinates because it creates new opportunities. </p><p>We can train our subordinates by placing them in positions of influence, providing tactical decision games, letting them experiment, and most important of all, letting them fail. Through their failure, they will learn and get better. &nbsp;</p><p>For adaptation to be effective, commanders must readily exploit the opportunities uncovered by subordinates. Commanders cannot remain tied to plans that blind them to fleeting opportunities. While making the best possible preparations, they must welcome and take advantage of unforeseen opportunities.</p>

TACTICS SERIES: POST 5 | Adapting

<h2>Speed in Combat</h2><p>"<em>Hit quickly, hit hard and keep right on hitting. Give the enemy no rest, no opportunity to consolidate his forces and hit back at you.</em>" —Holland M. Smith</p><p>When we think of weapons, we typically think of rifles, pistols, machine guns, mortars, or rocket launchers. A pilot may recognize that weapons include helicopters and planes. But an often-overlooked weapon is one of the most powerful, creating an advantage for infantry, pilots, and commanders alike. That weapon is speed.&nbsp;</p><p>How can speed be a weapon? Take hockey, for example. In hockey, a breakaway uses speed as a weapon. By passing the puck quickly down the ice, one team denies the other a chance to set up its defense. Speed circumvents their opponent's ability to respond in an organized manner.&nbsp;</p><p>The results of speed often go beyond the immediate goal. How many times have you seen a team score on a fast break, steal the ball, then score again? Unable to regain their composure, the victims of the fastbreak become victims of a rally. The victims lose confidence. Passes go astray; signals become crossed; tempers flare; arguments ensue. The same thing can happen in combat.</p><p>Great leaders have repeatedly stated the value of speed in combat. Napoleon said, "I may lose a battle, but I shall neverlose a minute." Nathan Bedford Forrest told the secret of his many victories: "Get there first with the most men." General Patton said in 1943, "When the great day of battle comes, remember your training and remember above all else that speed and violence of attack are the sure road to success." History's great commanders differed in many ways, but one thing they shared was a sense of the importance of speed.</p><p>In Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the Marines moved so fast when they captured the operations officer of the Grenadian army, he said to them, "You appeared so swiftly in so many places where we didn't expect you that it was clear that resistance was hopeless, so I recommended to my superiors that we lay down our arms and go into hiding." That is what speed, used as a weapon, can do for you.&nbsp;</p><h3>What is Speed?</h3><p>Speed in combat has two main parts: physical speed and mental speed.</p><p>Physical speed includes movement, maneuver, rapid execution of drills, and quick transitions between tasks. It is how fast we can reposition, reinforce, exploit, or pursue.</p><p>Mental speed includes rapid assessment, decision-making, and communication. It is how fast we can understand what is happening and choose what to do next. Attacking the enemy's mind is a central tenet of maneuver warfare.</p><h3>Speed and Time</h3><p>Speed is about controlling time. Every action in combat takes time—observing, deciding, moving, firing, reorganizing. If we complete these actions faster than the enemy, we gain an advantage. </p><p>Making the most of every hour and every minute is as important for speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace of events. We are always saying to ourselves and to others, "Faster! Faster!" We know that if speed is a weapon, so is time.</p><h3>Timing</h3><p>Speed alone is not enough. Timing matters. Timing requires an appreciation for the rhythm of combat, so we can exploit it to our advantage. Timing means knowing when to act and, equally important, when not to act.</p><p>Opportunities in combat are often brief. A flank may be exposed for only minutes. A reserve may commit too early. A unit may become temporarily disorganized. Leaders must recognize these moments and act immediately.</p><p>Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed too ccur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and times to set the stage and wait.</p><h3>Relative Speed</h3><p>Going fast and making efficient use of time are both parts of the answer to the question, "What is speed?" However, something else must be considered: the enemy. As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily only if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed. Superiority in relative speed allows us to maintain the initiative throughout the operation.</p><h3>Continuing Speed</h3><p>To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then, because when we are not moving faster, the advantage and initiative pass to him.</p><p>One way to sustain speed is to use the effects of combined arms. When the infantry must break contact temporarily to maneuver, resupply, or recover, other forces can keep the pressure on. Maneuver cannot be sustained indefinitely, but the momentum can be maintained.&nbsp;</p><h3>Speed and Change</h3><p>To act consistently faster than the enemy, it is necessary to do more than just move quickly. It is also necessary to make rapid transitions between actions. While there are many types of transitions in combat, the important thing to remember is that transitions produce friction. Reducing friction minimizes the tempo loss it causes at the point of transition. A unit that can make transitions faster and more smoothly than another unit can be said to have greater relative speed.</p><p>Battle drills and rehearsals can be conducted to smooth out procedures for rapidly changing organizations. The faster these transitions canbe made, the more effective the force becomes.</p><p>This can be summarized by Boyd's theory, which states that conflict may be viewed as a time-competitive cycle of observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA). First, each party to a conflict enters the fray by observing itself, its surroundings, and its enemy. In tactics, this equates to adopting a hunting instinct: searching, actively looking, hunting the enemy, and seeing what he is doing or is about to do. It also includes anticipating the enemy's next moves—getting inside his mind.</p><p>Second, based on those observations, the combatant orients to the situation, that is, produces a mental image of the situation and gains situational awareness. This awareness becomes the foundation for a plan. Generally, thebetter the orientation, the better the plan.&nbsp;</p><p>Next, based on this orientation, the combatant decides upon a course of action. The decision is developed into a plan that can be disseminated to subordinates for planning and execution.&nbsp;</p><p>Last, the combatant acts, or puts the decision into effect. In tactics, this is the execution phase in which the decision or plan is implemented. Since this action has changed the situation, the combatant again observes, beginning the cycle anew. Boyd's cycle is also known as the OODA loop.</p><p>Boyd's theory helps define the term "maneuver." It means being consistently faster than our opponent. As our enemy observes and orients on our initial action, we must be observing, orienting, deciding, and acting on our second action. As we enact our third, fourth, and fifth moves, the time gap between our actions and our enemy's reactions widens. Our enemy falls behind in a panicked game of catch-up. Everything he does is too late.&nbsp;</p><p>Thus, the military answer to the question "What is speed?" is not simple. Nonetheless, it is central to every aspect of tactics. As General George Patton said, "In small operations, as in large, speed is the essential element of success."</p><h3>Becoming Faster</h3><p>Now we see clearly the importance of speed. We want to be fast. How do we do it? </p><p>We start by recognizing the importance of time. Our sense of the importance of time, of urgency, must direct our actions. We must work to cultivate that sense within ourselves.</p><p>Once we have it, there are several things we can do to increase speed. First, we can keep everything simple. Simplicity promotes speed; complexity slows things down.</p><p>Second, speed is increased through decentralization. Decentralization is an important concept in the execution of maneuver warfare. How do we achieve decentralization while still retaining control? We use two main tools that provide the required control over the effort and the decentralization of its execution. These tools are mission tactics and the commander's intent.</p><ul><li style="list-style-type: none;" data-mce-style="list-style-type: none;"><ul><li>Mission tactics means giving a subordinate a mission and its purpose, but not telling them exactly how to accomplish it. The higher commander explains what needs to be done and why, and the subordinate decides how to do it. This allows leaders at lower levels to act quickly as situations change without waiting for permission.&nbsp;</li><li>The commander’s intent explains the mission's overall purpose. When subordinates understand that purpose, they can adapt to changing conditions without losing focus or slowing down. Clear intent allows leaders to act independently to accomplish the commander's intent.</li></ul></li></ul><p>A third way to become faster is through experience. Experience breeds speed. Experience gives units advantages over other, less experienced units. We can give them experience through tactical decision games, war games, field exercises, and rehearsals. These and other forms of training help reduce the stress and confusion of combat.</p><p>Another way speed gains from experience is through the development of lateral communication and coordination. If all communication is up and down the chain of command, action will move slowly. If commanders and leaders at every level communicate laterally—if we, as leaders, talk directly to other leaders—action moves much faster.</p><p>A fifth way to become faster is for the commander to position himself at the point of friction. This position may be with the main effort, with a supporting effort, or in the rear. A commander who is forward can instantly influence the battle as the situation develops. The key is to be where we can best influence the actions of our units.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>We must be faster than our opponent. This means we must move fast, but, more importantly, we must act faster than our enemy. The aim is to tailor our tactics so that we can act faster than the enemy force can react. Our ability to plan, decide, and execute faster than our enemy creates an advantage that we can exploit. We have just discussed ways to improve our speed.&nbsp;</p><p>When applied properly, speed seizes initiative and disrupts enemy cohesion. It sets the conditions for decisive action. <span style="font-family: inherit; font-weight: inherit;">In the end, speed is not about movement alone. It is about creating a pace of events the enemy cannot survive.</span></p>

TACTICS SERIES: POST 4 | Speed in Combat

<h2>Gaining the Advantage</h2><p>Before a decision can be forced, an advantage must be gained. We strive to gain an advantage over our adversary by exploiting every aspect of a situation to secure victory. We win not by overpowering him with our own strength, but by punishing mistakes and never letting go of the initiative. This post will discuss several ways to generate leverage and gain an advantage over the enemy.</p><p>A unit may be smaller, less equipped, or outnumbered, yet still hold the advantage if it can act faster, think clearer, or exploit weaknesses better than its opponent. Take, for example, the American Indian ambush technique. A small number of warriors would draw a superior force into close terrain, where a larger force would quickly surround and ambush the soldiers. The enemy went from pursuing to being defeated.</p><h3>Combined Arms</h3><p>The use of combined arms is a key means of gaining advantage. It is based on the idea of presenting the enemy not merely with a problem, but with a dilemma—a no-win situation. We combine supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver in such a way that any action the enemy takes to avoid one threat makes him more vulnerable to another. For example, an entrenched enemy should discover that if he stays hunkered down in fighting holes, indirect fire and close air support will blast him out. If he comes to attack, the infantry will cut him down. If he tries to retreat, mechanized infantry and airpower will pursue him to his destruction. That is combined arms.</p><p>Modern tactics are combined arms tactics. That is, it combines the effects of various arms—infantry, armor, indirect, aviation, and now drones—to achieve the greatest possible effect against the enemy. Artillery and infantry, for example, are often employed together because their capabilities complement each other. At the same time, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are protected by the other arm's capabilities.</p><p>There is still a tendency in each separate unit... to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire... That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get harmony in music, each instrument must support the others. To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support the other. Team play wins. - General Patton, 1941</p><h3>Maneuver</h3><p>Maneuver provides us a means to gain an advantage over the enemy. In too many battles, one or both sides have sought to gain an advantage in combat through firepower and attrition. In World War 1, one side would rush across no-mans-land under murderous fire and attempt to push an opponent off the desired terrain. If the attack succeeded—and few did—the enemy counterattacked, reoccupying the same terrain they had before. The cost in casualties and equipment was high and often produced no decisive results. We want to avoid this type of engagement.</p><p>Traditionally, maneuver has meant moving in a way that gains positional advantage. For example, we may maneuver by enveloping an exposed enemy flank, by denying the enemy terrain critical to his goals, or by seizing a position that allows us to fire at the enemy while protecting us against their fire. We may maneuver in other dimensions as well. For instance, we may also maneuver in time by increasing relative speed and operating at a faster tempo than the enemy. Normally, we maneuver both in time and space to gain advantage and, ultimately, victory at the least possible cost.</p><h3>Exploiting the Environment&nbsp;</h3><p>The environment offers tremendous opportunities to gain an advantage over the enemy. We must understand the characteristics of any environment where we may have to operate. More importantly, we must understand how terrain, weather, and darkness or reduced visibility affect our own and our adversary’s ability to fight.</p><p><strong>Terrain</strong></p><p>Our objective is to employ tactics that turn the terrain to our advantage and disadvantage our opponent. Terrain impacts our maneuver and influences our dispositions. We must understand terrain and comprehend its effects, as it may limit our movement, reduce our visibility, or restrict our fires. We must be aware that the enemy also seeks advantage from terrain, and is shaping their maneuver and dispositions just as it is shaping ours.</p><p><strong>Weather</strong></p><p>Since the weather affects Roblox minimally, I will skim over it. However, understanding weather, and specifically (for Roblox especially), the effects it has on visibility is vital. Weather that limits your visibility also limits the enemy's, and you can use it to outmaneuver them without being spotted.</p><p><strong>Darkness or Reduced Visibility</strong></p><p>Similarly to weather, units that can operate effectively in the hours of darkness or during periods of reduced visibility often gain a significant advantage over their opponents. Reduced visibility can make the simplest of tasks difficult to accomplish. This obvious disadvantage can be turned to our advantage by forces trained, equipped, and able to operate at night. Night operations can produce great gains against a force that cannot operate at night.</p><h3>Complementary Forces</h3><p>Complementary forces are the idea of fix-and-flank and are an important way to gain an advantage. The idea behind complementary forces is to use our forces as a hammer and anvil by crushing the enemy between two or more powerful actions. For example, consider an enemy squad hiding behind the military crest of a hill. From the front, it is protected, and if we attempt to maneuver, the enemy can simply maneuver as well to remain behind the hill. However, if we keep one fireteam there and maneuver another fireteam to the enemy’s flank, then the enemy is now vulnerable, as they can no longer use the hill for protection against both.</p><p>Sun Tzu described this concept as the cheng and the ch'i. The cheng is the more direct, obvious action. It fixes the enemy. The ch'i is the unexpected or extraordinary action. It is the bid for a decision, or, as we call it today, the main effort. These two actions work together against the enemy. The concept is basic, but it can be implemented in a variety of combinations limited only by our imagination.</p><h3>Surprise</h3><p>Achieving surprise can greatly increase leverage. In fact, surprise can often prove decisive. We try to gain surprise through deception, stealth, and ambiguity. Sun Tzu stated that “War is based on deception,”. We use deception to mislead our opponents about our real intentions and capabilities.<br>Surprise can be generated through stealth. Stealth is advantageous when maneuvering against an enemy. It reduces the chance of detection, leaving the enemy vulnerable to surprise attacks for which he may be unprepared. We may also employ stealth through ambush, which is perhaps the most effective means of surprise, especially at the lower tactical level, where surprise is easiest to achieve.</p><h3>Asymmetry</h3><p>Fighting asymmetrically means gaining an advantage through imbalance, applying strength against an enemy's weakness. Fighting asymmetrically means using dissimilar techniques and capabilities to maximize our strengths while exploiting the enemy's weaknesses. Fighting asymmetrically means fighting the enemy on our terms rather than on his. By fighting asymmetrically, we do not have to be numerically superior to defeat the enemy. We only need to exploit his vulnerabilities. For example, using infantry to fight enemy infantry is symmetrical. Using attack helicopters to engage enemy infantry is fighting asymmetrically.</p><h3>From Advantage to Decision</h3><p>Gaining the advantage is not the end state. It is the pathway to decision. Once an advantage is established, it must be exploited. Failing to act allows the enemy time to recover and rebalance the fight.</p><p>Advantage creates opportunity. Decisive action converts opportunity into victory.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Modern warfare still rewards those who gain the advantage early and maintain it relentlessly. Technology may change, but the fundamentals remain the same. Combined arms, maneuver, surprise, complementary forces, the environment, and asymmetric warfare all shape outcomes long before the final blow is struck.<br>This is what Sun Tzu meant when he wrote: "Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates."</p>

TACTICS SERIES: POST 3 | Gaining the Advantage

<h2>Achieving a Decision: Turning Opportunity Into Victory</h2><p>In war, every action has one main goal: to force a decision. We are often reminded that firepower, numbers, or perfect plans alone do not win battles. Victory happens when a force breaks the enemy’s ability to resist, whether physically, mentally, or morally. To "achieve a decision" means shaping events so the enemy can no longer keep fighting. In the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805, Napoleon's strategic ingenuity forced the combined forces of Austria and Russia into disarray, leaving them unable to continue the fight effectively. This not only led to a decisive French victory but also underscored the importance of breaking the enemy’s cohesion rather than merely overpowering them.<br></p><p>This idea is simple, but not easy. Making a decision requires judgment, timing, and a willingness to act with purpose even in the face of uncertainty.</p><h3>The Goal: Shatter Cohesion, Not Just Bodies</h3><p><br>One of the most important lessons from Marine Corps doctrine is that warfare is fundamentally psychological. The point is <em>not </em>to wipe out every enemy element, but to attack what holds them together. When an enemy loses cohesion—when their plans unravel, their leaders lose control, their units hesitate—<em>the battle is already decided</em>, even if many of their forces remain intact.<br></p><p>Achieving a decision is about creating that break.<br></p><p>Sometimes it comes from overwhelming violence at the right moment. Sometimes it’s caused by a small disruption—a flank collapsing, an element being isolated, or a rapid shift in tempo that the enemy can’t match. The scale matters less than the effect: the enemy becomes unable to continue effective resistance.</p><h3>Tempo: Acting Faster Than the Enemy Can React<br></h3><p>Maneuver warfare emphasizes tempo. The side that cycles through observation, orientation, decision, and action faster gains control of the fight. In practice, this looks like:</p><ul><li>Acting before the enemy finishes thinking<br></li><li>Forcing them into a reactive posture<br></li></ul><p>Giving them problems faster than they can solve them<br><br>When we keep up the tempo, we take the initiative. If the enemy is always reacting, they lose cohesion, and chances for decisive action open up. <br><br>Making a decision often depends on identifying these moments and acting on them immediately.</p><h3>Surfaces, Gaps, and Exploiting Opportunity<br></h3><p>History teaches that no enemy is strong everywhere. They have surfaces, which are strengths, and gaps, which are weaknesses. A force that can spot these patterns can shape the battle before any decisive action starts.<br></p><ul><li>A surface invites avoidance.</li><li>A gap invites exploitation.</li></ul><p>The key is to avoid fighting the battle exactly as the enemy wants. Instead, we should fight in a way that exposes and widens their weaknesses. When we break through a gap and attack the enemy from within, we often create a significant impact that leads to a quick decision.</p><h3>The Decisive Action: When to Strike<br></h3><p>In war, decisive actions rarely happen under perfect conditions. They come from <strong>bold judgment at the right time</strong>. Leaders need to be ready to act when an opportunity is just starting to appear, not when it is already clear.<br></p><p>The decisive moment might be:</p><ul><li>When the enemy commits their reserve</li><li>When their communication wavers</li><li>When their flank overextends</li><li>When their attention is fixed on the wrong threat</li></ul><p>What matters most is noticing when the enemy is vulnerable and using combat power to take full advantage of that weakness.</p><h3>Maintaining Pressure: The Follow-Through</h3><p><br>Even after a decisive strike, the enemy might try to regain control. Doctrine stresses <strong>pursuit <em>and </em>exploitation</strong>, meaning we keep pressing the attack so the enemy cannot recover. This is where many battles are truly won. If we wait too long, the enemy might pull themselves together again, and the decision could be delayed or lost.<br></p><p>To achieve a decision, we must:<br></p><ul><li>Follow success rapidly<br></li><li>Keep the enemy off balance<br></li><li>Deny them time to reorganize<br></li><li>Victory is confirmed when the enemy can no longer mount meaningful resistance.</li></ul><h3>Why It Matters Today</h3><p><br>Modern conflicts remain deeply dependent on quick decision-making and the ability to disrupt an opponent's cohesion. Despite advances in technology, the core principles persist. For instance, in Ukraine, forces deployed drone swarming technology to rapidly disorient opposing units, demonstrating how modern tactics apply age-old military strategies.<br></p><ul><li>Think faster<br></li><li>Act faster<br></li><li>Exploit weakness<br></li><li>Break cohesion<br></li><li>Press the advantage<br></li></ul><p>Achieving a decision is more than just a phrase from doctrine. It is a mindset: win by making the enemy unable to keep fighting.</p>

TACTICS SERIES: POST 2 | Achieving a Decision: Turning Opportunity Into Victory

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